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The Xinjiang Riots: Tried Paradigms, Fresh Tensions 
July 14, 2009 in Xinjiang by The China Beat | No comments 
By James Leibold 
The mainstream media, both Western and Chinese, seem to be struggling to make sense of the deadly 
riots that broke out in the Xinjiang capital of Urumqi last week. Well-worn explanations on both sides 
have largely failed to grasp the complexities behind this new, unprecedented wave of mass communal 
violence in China. Not since the dying days of the Manchu Qing empire has China witnessed this sort 
of spontaneous ethnically-based violence. 
 
With initial headlines like “Chinese riot police, Muslims clash in northwestern city,” “China in deadly 
crackdown after Uighurs go on the rampage,” and “Uighurs cling to life in People’s hospital as China’s 
wounds weep,” the foreign media painted the usual picture of the Chinese Communist Party and its 
security apparatuses brutally cracking down on the repressed and helpless minorities. 
In much of the early reporting the emphasis lay on “the heavy-handed use of force by the Chinese 
security forces” and the subsequent tightening of media and Internet control, rather than the mob rule 
and racial retribution being doled out by Uighur and Han youth alike. When searching for answers to 
this wanton and impulsive brutality, the foreign media wheeled out its usual critique of state-
sponsored violence against the Uighurs, Tibetans and other ethnic minorities in China. 
Yet, this time, many of the dead and wounded appear to have been Han rather than ethnic minorities. 
The confusion surrounding this misidentification caused theLondon Evening Standard, among other 
media outlets, to use a photo of two blood-soaked Han women to invocate the “blood and defiance” 
and “Tiananmen’s spirit” of a group of Uighur women who confronted security forces several days 
after the initial incident. 
Seeking to counter this familiar criticism, the official Chinese media went on the front foot; and, in 
sharp contrast to its handling of last year’s unrest in Tibet, immediately reported the Urumqi violence 
in graphic detail, hoping to define rather than suppress the message both domestically and 
internationally. Yet, its coverage provided no fresh explanations, reverting instead to familiar clichés 
and slogans. 
The Chinese media was quick to stress how unidentified “rioters” and “outlaws,” “controlled and 
instigated from abroad” by “the “Uighur Dalai Lama” Rebiya Kadeer, unleashed “the most inhumane 
atrocities too horrible to look at.” Behind headlines like “Recalling the nightmare: witnesses’ account 
of Xinjiang riot,” and “Ravaged by riot, Xinjiang’s capital in horror,” the Chinese media sought to 
expose those “evil” and “external” forces that left Urumqi “blood tainted,” while stressing the “heroic 
deeds” of all ethnic groups in China to uphold “national unity and social stability” in the face of 
international criticism and outside meddling. 
 
While details remain sketchy, eyewitness accounts tell a different story: the outbreak of spontaneous 
communal violence between China’s Han ethnic majority and the increasingly marginalized Uighur 
inhabitants of Xinjiang. On the evening of July 5th, several hundred Uighur youths went on a bloody 
rampage following a peaceful demonstration over a separate incident of ethnic violence at a 
Guangdong toy factory. The results, according to Chinese government figures, was the destruction of 
thousands of dollars worth of property, the death of nearly two hundred innocent civilians and another 
thousand injured. 
In the days that followed, bands of roving Han vigilantes armed with kitchen knives, hammers, metal 
pipes and other improvised weapons sought to mete out revenge in the Uighur suburbs of the city. 
Both this incident and last year’s unrest in the Tibetan capital of Lhasa and other Tibetan areas 
represent a worrying new wave of ethnic violence (not only physical violence on the streets of cities 
like Lhasa and Urumqi, but also virtual violence on the numerous ethnically-based blogging sites on 
the Chinese Internet). And here the well-worn paradigms of state repression and foreign incitement 
conceal more than they reveal. 
The root causes behind this spike in communal tension are far more complex and multidimensional 
than the media would have us believe. It is true that state-sponsored Han migration has culturally and 
economically marginalized the once majority Uighur population of Xinjiang—a situation that has been 
made worse by the recent global economic downturn. 
But many Han migrants are themselves unhappy, and they are increasingly pointing a finger at the 
state’s extensive affirmative action policies (youhui zhengce) that provides special economic, cultural 
and educational benefits to the minorities. These policies, they claim, only serve to mollycoddle the 
“backward” and “simple” minorities, while rendering the naturally superior Han second-class citizens. 
Caught in-between these increasingly polarized and agitated ethnic communities is the Chinese state, 
which, rather than orchestrating the brutal oppression of the non-Han minorities, finds itself 
increasingly powerless to stop the spiralling circle of ethnic hatred which its policies helped to foster in 
the first place. 
In a recent online report on the violence in the Tibetan region last year, the progressive, Beijing-based 
Gongmeng (Open Constitution Initiative) think tank explored some of the major social causes behind 
this wellspring of violent discontent. The report claimed that the rapid (almost dizzying) pace of state-
directed change in frontier regions like Tibet and Xinjiang has failed to bring any real benefit to the 
vast majority of the minority inhabitants in these regions, instead resulting in growing income 
disparity, high education dropout rates, growing unemployment and underemployment, cultural 
dislocation and a growing sense of powerlessness. While asserting that “the state’s major preferential 
policies and support have not been of any effective benefit to the main body of Tibetan people,” the 
report also speaks of the rise of a new Tibetan “aristocracy,” whose legitimacy rests on central 
government affiliation rather than traditional clan or religious ties, making it easier for this new elite to 
turn a blind eye to the negative social consequences of imposed modernization. 
The report’s authors argue that the rich tradition of “Han departmentalism” (hanzu benwei zhuyi), 
which seeks to compartmentalize different ethnic communities under a hollow ideology of Confucian 
harmony, continues to hinder effective political responses to these problems. The structure of 
governance in autonomous regions like Tibet and Xinjiang means that, on the one hand, minority 
cadres have carved out “deep-rooted local power elite networks” and seek to protect their personal 
interests by blaming all social unrest on “foreign forces” as “fig leaves to conceal their mistakes in 
governance and to repress social discontent,” while on the other hand, continued discrimination and 
social marginalization among ordinary, non-Han minorities hinders their identification with the PRC 
state and any shared concept of nationhood. 
 
In seeking to understand this troubling rise in ethnic-based violence in China, we need to look beyond 
the usual bogeymen at the increasingly torn fabric of Reform Era Chinese society. In the end, the over 
twenty years of rapid economic growth has unleashed as many demons as it has benefits—evident in 
the increasing number of ordinary citizens who are turning to ethnic profiling and violence to vent 
their shared frustrations. The result is a burgeoning level of internal racism that should concern us all. 
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